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Abstract
We are in an era of uncertainty over whose rules will govern global economic inte
gration. With the growing market share of Chinese firms and the power of the
Chinese state it is unclear if Western firms will continue to dominate transnational
governance. Exploring these dynamics through a study of contract rules in the global
cotton trade, this article conceptualizes commodity chain governance as a contested
process of institution-building. To this end, the global commodity chain/global value
chain (GCC/GVC) framework must be revised to better account for the broader
institutional context of commodity chain governance, institutional variation across
space, and strategic action in the construction of legitimate governance arrangements.
I provide a more dynamic model of GCC governance that stresses how strategic
action, existing institutions, and dominant discourses intersect as firms and states
compete for institutional power within a commodity chain. This advances our
understandings of how commodity chain governance emerges and changes over time.
Keywords
transnational governance, commodity chain, legitimacy, institutional change, contract
arbitration
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Introduction
We are in an era of uncertainty over whose rules will govern global economic integration. Disputes between the United States and increasingly powerful states like China
and India led to a collapse of the Doha Round of negotiations at the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In the controversial case of censorship and cyber attacks between
China and the global corporate giant Google, a representative from the Chinese
Foreign Ministry warned that Google must adhere to China’s laws and regulations if
it wants to access the growing Chinese market.1 And in negotiations over contract
rules for the global cotton sector, global commodity merchants such as Cargill and
Louis Dreyfus have found themselves in a face-off with the Chinese state over how
contract rules should be standardized globally. These struggles raise critical questions
about how transnational governance institutions are constructed as legitimate and
enforceable on the global stage.
Despite the prominence of such struggles, a key school of thought on transnational
governance, the global commodity/value chain (GCC/GVC) approach, largely overlooks these dynamics. GCC/GVC scholars focus on typifying governance structures
and forms of coordination in diverse commodity chains and understanding their
implications for weaker actors’ ability to “upgrade” into more profitable activities.
As such, GCC/GVC scholars give little attention to how transnational governance
institutions are constructed to begin with—that is, to the contested processes of
institution-building.
I explore the idea of commodity chain governance as a contested process of
institution-building through a study of negotiations over contract rules in the global
cotton trade. These negotiations offer an interesting case as current dynamics in the
sector reflect broader geoeconomic and geopolitical tensions. Transnational cotton
merchants gained significant economic power in the cotton trade from the 1970s to the
1990s. However, with the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) from
1995 to 2005 and the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, China burst onto the
scene as a major player in cotton imports. The case of cotton contract rules thus highlights the roles of both private corporations and geopolitical/geoeconomic competition
in unfolding negotiations over contract rules.
Evidence from this case suggests that understanding processes of institution-building
within commodity chains requires addressing key weaknesses in the GCC/GVC framework. As a range of scholars have noted, GCC/GVC scholars have largely ignored
how the broader institutional context in which commodity chains are embedded influences governance. In this way, they overlook how actors’ interests and relative power
are constituted in part by existing institutions. Furthermore, GCC/GVC research overlooks institutional variation across space. As such, GCC/GVC scholars largely see
governance structures as directly structuring the distribution of profits along a chain
through the functional division of labor, missing the more subtle competitive advantages gained by convincing others to “play by your rules.” Finally, agency is underspecified in the GCC/GVC framework. While the GCC approach is based on a view of
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transnational corporations that “organize” the chain and supplier firms that try to
“upgrade,” agency in the construction of specific forms of coordination like contracts
is overlooked.
I address these oversights in order to specify a more dynamic model of commodity
chain governance that gives attention to how actors strategize and struggle in a competition to inscribe their institutional preferences in new governance forms. In this
view, actors, and particularly more powerful actors, should be viewed as institutional
entrepreneurs who cannot automatically govern a commodity chain but rather strategically construct new governance institutions that reflect their interests and will be accepted
as legitimate by other actors. At the same time, actors’ interests, strategies, and bargaining power are constituted through their differential embeddedness in existing institutional contexts across space, at various scales, and particularly in dominant, already-global
institutions.
Through this analysis, I make three central arguments. First, I argue that the negotiation of cotton contract rules was a contest over whose rules would become global
rules. In the cotton trade, different actors have historically been embedded in distinct
institutional arrangements governing contracts, including formal versus informal
rules, private versus state-led rules, and rules governing national, regional, or postcolonial trade, each with distinct business practices, customs and understandings of what
is fair and just. Given this differential embeddedness and the advantages that come
from playing by your own rules, we see that the most powerful actors—transnational
merchants and the Chinese state—struggled over whose trade association would govern global contract rules, while weaker actors struggled against the imposition of
transnational merchants’ preferred rules.
My second argument is that broader institutional shifts on a global scale play a critical
role in shaping the power dynamics in sector-specific institution-building. In negotiations over cotton contract rules, the relative bargaining power of transnational merchants
versus the Chinese state and Chinese textile manufacturers was constituted through
broader institutional shifts exogenous to the cotton trade itself: the end of the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement; the accession of China to the WTO; and the 1958 New York Convention
on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The former two shifts constructed China
as the new powerhouse in cotton imports, giving the Chinese state and Chinese textile
manufacturers significant power to challenge the conventional trader-driven governance
structure of the cotton trade. The latter shift, however, gave transnational merchants a
privileged position in governance negotiations as their preferred, privatized form of contract governance and discourses regarding what makes contract governance fair were
already institutionalized globally through this inter-state agreement.
Finally, I argue that strategic action within these institutional constraints was critical to transnational merchants’ efforts to establish global contract rules that would
both institutionalize their preferences and be accepted as legitimate by other actors.
Transnational merchants acted as institutional entrepreneurs who retooled their
existing institutions, gave strategic concessions, and drew on legitimating discourses
to patch together an institutional arrangement that other actors would accept. Given

6		

Politics & Society 39(1)

their differential institutional embeddedness, paired with their shifting competitiveness in global markets, weaker actors responded differently to merchants’ proposed
governance solutions.
Through this study, I attempt to hold together a range of concerns that have been
raised regarding the GCC/GVC literature. First, I am responding to Bair’s call to
re-embed GCC/GVC governance in its broader institutional context.2 At the same
time, I am building upon the Manchester school in economic geography in its attempt
to bring questions of institutional variation into GCC/GVC research.3 Third, by focusing on institution-building, I respond to Gibbon and Ponte’s call for a better understanding of how certain forms of governance emerge in commodity chains.4 Finally,
I try to take seriously the call to adopt a cultural political economic approach to GCC
research by giving attention to the critical role of discourse in private governance.5

Governance as a Contested Process
of Institution-Building
In recent years, a host of “chain” approaches have been widely used to study new
forms of transnational governance. While emerging from various traditions, most
prominent in sociological and interdisciplinary research are the global commodity
chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) approaches. Hopkins and Wallerstein first
introduced the GCC approach as a critique of the methodological nationalism that
dominated theories of development and economic change.6 Rather than analyzing
trade among nation-states, it allowed researchers to conceptualize how production and
distribution processes stretched across national borders.
The research agenda of Gary Gereffi and his associates has been at the center of the
GCC literature. In the mid-1990s, these scholars emphasized the emergence of private
governance forms on the global stage. They examined how “lead firms” come to “drive”
an entire sector by controlling nodes of the commodity chain with high barriers to
entry7 or, in a later formulation, through the ability to determine the functional division
of labor on the chain (who does what, using what standards, to which specifications
and at what price).8 From this type of analysis, Gereffi distinguished between two
major types of governance structures—producer-driven and buyer-driven.
The producer-driven/buyer-driven distinction aimed to capture the overall power
structure of a commodity chain. It could not, however, explain how the relationships
between specific nodes in the chain were coordinated.9 In his later work under the
auspices of the global value chain (GVC) approach, Gereffi and his associates shifted
focus to this latter dimension—to delineate different “forms of coordination” within
commodity chains, or the specific mechanisms through which firms manage “handsoff” control of supply chains.10 They argue that the coordination of interfirm transactions is largely determined by asset specificity, or the complexity of transactional
information and the relative importance of codification in facilitating hands-off
control.11
By exploring the distinct organizational logics of different commodity chains, the
GCC/GVC research tradition makes important contributions to our understanding of
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how new forms of private governance redistribute the benefits of production and distribution, as well as what opportunities and constraints supplier firms face as they try to
“upgrade” into more profitable nodes of the chain. However, in doing so, GCC/GVC
scholars have largely focused on typifying governance structures and forms of coordination and exploring their effects. They have given little attention to the processes of
institution-building through which governance structures and forms of coordination
are constructed and change over time.
Thinking about processes of institution-building rather than just the types and effects
of transnational governance is critical for three reasons. First, as Cashore, Auld, and
Newsom suggest in their study of environmental certification in the forestry industry,
“any comparison of existing standards at one point in time misses the fact that rule
development is not static.”12 This is not to say that such comparisons are not useful but
that we also need “to understand the processes through which change occurs.”13
Second, exploring institution building raises the question of legitimacy in private governance. As economic sociologists have long noted, institutions of economic governance, whether private or state-centered, must be enforceable to be effective and
require a degree of legitimacy, or acceptance by other actors, to be enforceable.14 This
requires the ability not only to develop new governance forms but to persuade other
actors to accept and obey them. GCC/GVC scholarship has given little attention to the
legitimacy of private governance structures and forms of coordination.
Finally, understanding the dynamic process through which legitimate private gover
nance forms are constructed becomes even more important given current geopolitical
and geoeconomic shifts. With the decline of U.S. power since 1970, the current period
is an unsettled era characterized by “uncertainty and unpredictability” in which increasingly powerful firms and states challenge previously dominant ones in a struggle over
who will inscribe their interests into new institutions that allow expanded accumulation.15 These competitive dynamics have the potential to upset the prevailing governance structures that GCC/GVC scholars have documented. For example, GCC
scholars point to Walmart as the quintessential example of Western retailers’ ability to
consolidate economic and institutional power by “occupying points of leverage” in
the commodity chain.16 However, Appelbaum argues that in China “giant transnational contractors” are emerging who may be able to challenge “the current seemingly
unstoppable dominance of giant U.S.- and EU-based retailers as market makers.”17 He
foresees two possible future trajectories: these giant Chinese contractors could use
their position as “big suppliers” to challenge Western retailers, turning on its head the
idea of a buyer-driven chain; alternatively, they could “upgrade” and become powerful
buyers and retailers themselves. Amid this “cacophony of possible trajectories of
global change,” it is critical to understand the processes through which actors compete
to construct governance structures and forms of coordination.18
In order to understand processes of institution-building, we must first address three
additional critiques of GCC/GVC research. First, and perhaps most widely recognized,
is the failure of the GCC/GVC framework to consider the broader institutional context in
which commodity chain governance is embedded.19 While this was a weakness of Gereffi’s
original GCC framework, this problem has only intensified in the GVC approach.20 In
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their exploration of “forms of coordination,” Gereffi et al. explicitly exclude broader
institutional contexts from their analysis in order to focus on variables endogenous to
the commodity chain: “we feel confident that the variables internal to our model influence the shape and governance of global value chains in important ways, regardless of
the institutional context within which they are situated.”21 Yet, a range of scholars has
demonstrated that existing local, national, and supranational institutional contexts can
shape private governance.22 For our purposes, rather than assuming its irrelevance, we
need to assume that the broader institutional context is constitutive of the power
dynamics within a commodity chain, including which nodes become critical “leverage
points” from which actors can exert influence over the entire chain. In this view, the
broader institutional context establishes the terrain of struggle for commodity chainspecific forms of coordination and governance structures.
A second and related critique has been raised by economic geographers through the
global production network (GPN) approach: GCC/GVC research does not address
institutional variation across space. These scholars note that GCC/GVC scholars do
not engage the vast literature on “varieties of capitalism” that demonstrates the existence and persistence of distinct institutional forms, including legitimating discourses,
that stabilize capitalism.23 We need to consider that firms may have distinct interests
in and pursue different strategies for economic governance given their specific histories, their cultural practices and worldviews, and the institutional contexts in which
they are embedded.24 Forms of coordination are never merely neutral, efficient rules.
Rather, forms of coordination always represent someone’s institutional preference or a
compromise negotiated amid competing institutional preferences and conflicting
understandings of what is fair and just. At the same time, forms of coordination do not
only specify the distribution of profits in a commodity chain. They also structure competitive advantages in more subtle ways by determining who can play by the rules,
business practices, and cultural understandings with which they are most familiar.
Understanding how institutional variations converge in the construction of global
institutions thus means replacing the GCC/GVC’s focus on economic structure with a
spatialized, cultural political economic approach. We must understand how any form
of coordination such as a standard or contract is constructed through material and discursive contestation over whose institutional preferences will prevail.
Finally, the nature of agency in processes of global institution-building is underspecified in the GCC/GVC framework. Gereffi’s original GCC formulation does stress
the agency of transnational firms in the construction of private governance structures,
as transnational firms organize the functional division of labor in a chain in ways that
allow them to capture the most profits while disciplining suppliers from a distance.
Other scholars also note the agency of weaker actors, such as suppliers, who attempt
to change their position in this division of labor by “upgrading.”25 In the later GVC
approach, however, power and agency fall out of focus. Forms of coordination emerge
from asset specificity, not through political struggles and strategies.26 Even in the more
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agency-sensitive GCC version, however, there is little explanation of the processes
through which legitimate institutions are built.
I suggest that we can revise the GCC/GVC framework to capture processes of
institution-building by addressing these three weaknesses. This means understanding,
as Block suggests, that “there are many varieties of capitalism and there are many different ways that these varieties can be articulated together into a global system.”27 As
such, forms of coordination and the broader governance structure of a commodity chain
cannot be simply read off the economic structure or the asset specificity of the chain.
Rather, they should be understood as constructed through competition and strategic
action that is embedded within existing institutional arrangements across space and at
various scales.
To this end, we must see transnational firms not simply as “lead” firms by virtue of
their control of the most profitable nodes of a chain, which has somewhat static connotations. While their functional position on the chain is of critical importance, a more
dynamic view would also conceptualize them as “institutional entrepreneurs.”28 As
institutional entrepreneurs, transnational firms—and other actors along the commodity chain—work to develop institutional solutions and to mobilize other actors to support particular institutional arrangements.29 Strategic action is critical as they must
“creatively recombine and extend the institutional principles at their disposal to devise
new institutional solutions to their problems.”30 It is through such strategic action that
actors respond to challenges to their dominance and compete to translate their economic power into institutional power.
Institutional entrepreneurs operate within existing institutional arrangements, which
shape strategic action vis-à-vis transnational governance. In this view, national or
supranational institutional arrangements are not external to commodity chain governance but rather are constitutive of actors’ interests and strategies in governance negotiations. Actors in commodity chains—including transnational firms—are not
“placeless” entities that merely choose the most efficient solutions to their institutional
problems. Rather, they are embedded in a wide array of existing institutional structures, such as state institutions, private associations, informal customs, cultural styles
of doing business, and legitimating discourses. Actors struggle to have their institutional preferences inscribed into transnational governance arrangements. To achieve
this, they reflexively retool institutional technologies and reconstruct discourses to
legitimate their institutional preferences as appropriate, efficient, and even fair. At the
same time, other actors evaluate new governance arrangements and accept or reject
them based on their own embeddedness in existing institutions. In this view, which
firms will successfully institutionalize their interests into new private governance
arrangements is a critical axis of struggle.
Actors, of course, are not equal in these interactions. Understanding power inequali
ties in commodity chain governance is a central contribution of the GCC literature.
However, GCC scholars tend to put economic power at the center of their analyses. As
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such, they underemphasize the ways in which actors’ power is embedded in and constructed through dominant institutions. Institutional shifts exogenous to the commodity chain itself can significantly reconfigure power relations within the chain. For
example, the shift to “free trade” governance in the apparel sector through the end of
the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO radically reconstituted the power
dynamics in the cotton trade, making China the new power player.
Also critical for transnational governance negotiations are the power relations
inscribed in what Santos would call already “globalized localisms.”31 The institutional
preferences of some actors—particularly Western, transnational firms—have already
been institutionalized at the global scale within international organizations and interstate agreements. These actors thus have an advantage in their efforts to further inscribe
these preferences into commodity chain governance. For example, we will see that,
while cotton merchants had to persuade other actors to accept their contract rules as
legitimate, they enjoyed privileges in this struggle as their preferred, private form of
contract governance and their discourses about what makes contract governance “fair”
had already been institutionalized on the global scale.
In short, we must more carefully trace how strategic action, existing institutions,
and dominant discourses all intersect on a terrain of uneven power relations in the
construction of private governance. This perspective provides a more dynamic view of
governance by focusing on how actors construct legitimate institutions in ways that
will serve their interests, but in the context of institutional constraints, many of which
are exogenous to the commodity chain itself. This is not to deny that constraints such
as asset specificity are important. Rather, it suggests that such variables endogenous to
commodity chains are not sufficient to explain the forms of coordination that govern
interfirm transactions, how they emerge, and how they change over time.

Method
I collected and analyzed three types of data using the GCC approach to identify key
interviewees and research sites. First, I conducted document analysis of news articles, annual reports, minutes from meetings, and policy documents. Second, I analyzed
statistics on changes in global cotton production, consumption, and trade from 1970
to present from a dataset I obtained from the International Cotton Advisory Committee
(ICAC). Finally, I utilized a multisited ethnographic research strategy. This involved
conducting approximately eighty semi-structured interviews with cotton merchants,
textile manufacturers, state representatives, and trade association representatives.
I conducted these interviews during field visits to China, Benin, Brazil, Britain, and
the United States, as well as during four international cotton industry meetings that
I attended: the 2005 and 2006 annual meetings of the ICAC and the 2005 and 2006
annual meetings of the International Cotton Association (ICA). These conferences
brought together state and private sector representatives from cotton producing and
consuming countries around the world.
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Contract Rules and the
Structure of the Cotton Trade
Contract rules are an economic governance form that enables “actors in markets to
organize themselves, to compete and cooperate, and to exchange.”32 Standardized contract rules reduce the transaction costs of trade by providing mutual expectations for
buyers and sellers. Standard contract rules govern almost the entire market for bulk
commodities, as well as for the air and sea transport, construction, and finance sectors.33
A contract in the cotton trade is an agreement between two or more actors to buy
and sell a particular quantity and quality of cotton. Individual contracts can be made in
isolation from any formal set of rules (although customs and common practices always
inform contracts). In general, however, contracts for trading cotton are negotiated in
relation to contract rules, or a formalized set of norms outlining common terms of
exchange and procedures for settling disputes. Contract rules define the roles and
responsibilities that actors assume when carrying out a transaction, such as who will
be responsible for storage, transportation, and insurance; how payment will be made;
what quality of cotton is being bought/sold and who will verify its quality; and who
will settle disputes, the process through which they will be settled, and how they will
be enforced.
To understand negotiations over contract rules as a contested process, it is useful to
first understand how the cotton trade is organized and the key players involved. Figure 1
provides a snapshot of how the cotton trade is currently organized and embedded within
the broader apparel/textile commodity chain. The apparel commodity chain is held up
as a key example of Gereffi’s buyer-driven commodity chain. However, if we follow
the chain to its roots in raw material provision, which is rarely done, we discover a
range of other actors—such as merchants and cotton producers—that are typically
excluded from the discussion. Gibbon has called the raw material portion a “traderdriven” chain.34 The lead firms in this case are transnational merchants who gain dominance in three ways: by globally sourcing commodities to supply other firms, by their
command of huge volumes of information from all producing and consuming regions,
and by their access to capital and expertise in commodity futures markets.35 However,
just as Gereffi fails to consider raw material provision in the apparel commodity chain,
Gibbon does not account for how raw material supply chains funnel into other commodity chains for finished goods.
Talbot suggests that, to overcome this issue, we might best understand most chains
as divided into a few segments, each having their own governance structures.36 From
this view, we can conceptualize the cotton trade as being “driven” by transnational
merchants while, at the same time, it funnels into the buyer-driven apparel segment.
Important here is the fact that these different segments can overlap and conflict.37 Gov
ernance shifts in the apparel segment, for example, can have significant implications
for negotiations over forms of coordination—and the broader governance structure—
of the cotton segment, as we will see in the implications of the end of the MFA. Indeed,
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Figure 1. The cotton trade within the apparel/textile commodity chain

the way in which the governance structures of different segments of chains overlap is
a key source of dynamism in commodity chain governance.
Cotton is grown in more than eighty countries; however, a much smaller number
play a significant role in the transnational trade. In fact, the largest exporting countries—
the United States, India, Uzbekistan, the CFA zone bloc of producing countries,38
Australia, and Brazil—account for approximately 75 percent of all exports.39 Spinning
mills in more than one hundred countries consume cotton, but again a smaller number
of countries are major players in imports, and, recently, China has come to dominate.
In the 2007/2008 season, China accounted for approximately 36 percent of all cotton
imports (see Figure 2). The next largest importers that year accounted for much smaller
import shares: Turkey (9.7 percent), Pakistan (7.6 percent), Bangladesh (5.9 percent),
and Indonesia (5.3 percent).40
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International Cotton Advisory Committee, Documents of the ICAC (CD-ROM).

Linking cotton-producing countries with cotton-consuming countries are the merchants who have come to “drive” the chain in recent decades. There are thousands of
local merchants and hundreds of regional merchants. These smaller firms generally
sell cotton purchased locally to transnational merchants who will organize a transnational sale. A small number of merchants conduct the transnational trade. While precise
data on market share are difficult to obtain, by the early 2000s, about ten companies
handled more than two-thirds of the transnational trade in cotton.41 Industry players,
however, suggest that actual consolidation is likely higher; the largest three firms may
handle as much as 45% of the transnational trade.
It is these actors that are involved in negotiations over contract rules. However, they
come to negotiations from varied institutional backgrounds. Private companies handle
most transnational trade. Private firms generally belong to trade associations in which
contract rules are negotiated. In Western countries, private firms and trade associations
have a long history of negotiating contract rules, as we will see in the next section. In
many countries in the global South, in contrast, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled imports and exports of cotton in the postwar period, including in China, India,
Pakistan, Egypt, and the cotton-producing countries of the CFA zone. These SOEs
negotiated contract terms for, and settled disputes over, cotton exports or imports on
behalf of cotton producers or textile manufacturers. While some have been accused of
corruption, SOEs provided a counterweight in negotiations with transnational
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Table 1. Cotton Trade Associations 2009*
Name
Alexandria Cotton Exporters Association
American Cotton Shippers Association (1924)
Association Cotonnière Africaine (2002)
Association Cotonnière de Belgique
Association Française Cotonnière (1895—estimate)
Associazione Cotoniera Italiana (1883)
Australian Cotton Shippers Association
Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros (1917)
Bremer Baumwollbörse (1872)
Centro Algodonero Nacional (1887)
China Cotton Association
Cotton Association of India (1922)
Gdynia Cotton Association (1938)
Izmir Mercantile Exchange
Japan Cotton Traders Association
The Karachi Cotton Association (1933)
The Liverpool Cotton Association (1882)

Country
Egypt
United States
Regional
Belgium
France
Italy
Australia
Brazil
Germany
Spain
China
India
Poland
Turkey
Japan
Pakistan
UK

*These associations are members of the Committee for International Cooperation between Cotton
Associations (CICCA).
Source: Committee for International Cooperation between Cotton Associations, “CICCA,” http://www
.cicca.info/ (accessed April 2, 2009).

merchants, giving cotton producers and textile manufacturers bargaining power that
they could not exercise alone. Some of these SOEs continue to operate, while others
have been privatized through structural adjustment programs and neoliberal reforms.42
In the wake of SOE privatization, private actors in a number of countries have created
private trade associations to negotiate new, nationally focused contract rules (see Table
1). It is from this mixed landscape of public and (in some cases, newly) private rules,
focused on national or postcolonial trade networks and rooted in national legal systems, that actors are now negotiating global contract rules.

The History of Anglo-American Contract Rules
While it could be analytically useful to explore the history of contract rules in any country involved in the cotton trade, it is worth giving attention to the Anglo-American tradition, given its institutionalization in the global arena and thus its particular importance
for negotiations around global contract rules. Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in the United States and Britain, contract rules have represented a relatively
privatized governance form, rooted in the notions of freedom of contract and contract
sanctity.43 Through freedom of contract, states give private enterprises the right to
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enter into binding contracts and to define their contractual relationships individually
or through standard sectoral rules governed by private trade associations. Moreover,
firms are allowed to settle their own disputes through private arbitral bodies operating
independently of state courts. Through contract sanctity, states agree to enforce private contracts and the decisions of private arbitral bodies, as long as they follow the
limits and procedures of national laws.44 This governance form maximizes the autonomous authority of firms, strengthens the enforceability of private authority, and minimizes the scope for state intervention.
In the postwar period, Western states and firms, led by the United States, attempted
to extend this form of contract governance onto the global stage to better facilitate
transnational trade. Trade associations in Western countries had developed contract
rules that were largely domestically focused, based on national legal systems, which
meant their jurisdiction was limited to the jurisdiction of national state courts. At the
same time, struggles for decolonization were creating newly independent nation-states—
and trade with former colonies based on consent rather than sheer coercion—but there
were no legitimate rules to govern this trade. In this context, Western states negotiated
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, also known as the 1958 New York Convention. Based on this Con
vention, firms can contractually bind themselves to settle disputes in a particular state
court or through a particular private arbitral body.45 By ratifying the Convention, states
agreed to enforce the decisions of both other state courts and private arbitral bodies
without subjecting them to domestic rules and procedures, unless they contradicted
public policy, which was vaguely defined.
Through the 1958 New York Convention, the Anglo-American tradition of contract
governance became a “globalized localism” that constructed the power of private firms
to negotiate contract rules and settle their own disputes on a global stage. Importantly,
the 1958 New York Convention also institutionalized and globalized a particular discourse about what made contract rules “fair” that had emerged in relation to economic
liberalism in the nineteenth century. This is the notion that contractual obligations are
consensual and derive from the voluntary agreement of the parties to a contract.46 From
this view, contracts are to be viewed as expressing the wills and desires of individuals,
and “the law was not to police the equity of the bargain.”47 Although this global institutional infrastructure was put in place in the immediate postwar period, many sectors—
the cotton trade included—did not begin the process of transnational standardization
until much later.48

Transnational Merchants, China, and the Rivalry
for Institutional Power in the Cotton Trade
Transnational cotton merchants consolidated economic power within the cotton trade
from the 1970s to the 1990s. While the cotton trade has always been relatively global,
its global reach expanded significantly as textile firms in Asia outcompeted those in
Western countries (see Figure 2). To meet this new demand, domestic-oriented cotton
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producers such as those in the United States became exporters, and new cotton exporters emerged in a number of “developing” countries, such as Uzbekistan and countries
in CFA zone (see Figure 3). U.S. and European cotton merchants were positioned to
capture the most benefits given their position as powerful middlemen between relatively small and geographically dispersed cotton producers and textile mills around the
world.
Transnational cotton merchants expanded rapidly despite the lack of globally standardized contract rules to govern their transactions. The lack of standardized contract
rules did pose a problem for merchants given the inability of many of their trade partners to manage price risk. Many trade partners in developing countries did not (and do
not) have access to or the skills to use price risk-management tools such as futures
markets. If actors could not hedge their price risks, they would be much more likely to
default on contracts in the case of significant price fluctuations, as evidenced in the
“cotton contract crisis” of the 1970s.49 Despite these problems, efforts to standardize
transnational contract rules were overshadowed by new opportunities to gain a competitive advantage in a global market without clearly defined rules. Merchants competed to be reliable suppliers with the ability to absorb price risks and to secure reliable
clients who could do the same without defaulting on their contracts. Moreover, as they
grew in power vis-à-vis their clients, transnational merchants found themselves in a
favorable position to largely impose their contract rules—the rules of the Liverpool
Cotton Association (LCA)—on clients.
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However, the seemingly unrivalled power of transnational merchants faced a significant challenge with a radical shift in the power structure of the cotton market in the early
2000s. Through negotiations over the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the
WTO, states decided to move from the protectionist quota-system regulation of the
apparel sector by the MFA to neoliberal “free trade” governance. As quotas on apparel
were phased out, ending completely in 2005, retailers and branded marketers were able
to source apparel from firms in whichever country could offer the lowest prices. With its
accession to the WTO in 2001, China was by far the biggest winner as a result of the end
of quotas. In the course of a few years, China became the largest producer of textiles and
apparel—and thus the largest importer of cotton—in the world. China’s share of world
cotton imports jumped from 15 percent to 40 percent (see Figure 4).
The radical increase in China’s market share reconfigured competitive tensions in
the cotton trade and thus the incentives for standardizing rules. The significant market
share wielded by Chinese spinning firms after the MFA meant that merchants had
more to lose from widespread contract defaults in the Chinese market. When prices
fluctuated dramatically in 2004, for example, many Chinese spinning firms defaulted
on their contracts as they could not absorb the price loss and remain competitive. This
resulted in significant losses for transnational merchants:
We had a really bad experience in China. . . . We had sold a lot of cotton on pretty
good terms—high prices. But then the market dropped and prices fell in half—
a 20 to 30 cent drop. And we had a lot of bales in these contracts. And the Chinese
mills started defaulting on all these contracts. . . . This was a huge hit—we’re
talking millions and millions and millions of dollars. (Top 3 cotton merchant)
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Historically, sanctity of contract did not present a problem in China as contracts were
publicly regulated by the country’s state-owned enterprise (SOE), the China National
Textiles Import and Export Corporation (Chinatex), thus ensuring sanctity of contract.
However, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 required a range of neoliberal policy
reforms, including the privatization of Chinatex including a requirement to allow private firms to import cotton. Merchants faced an import market comprised of six thousand to ten thousand diverse spinning firms. Some of these spinning firms were large,
indeed, the largest in the world, with vertically integrated textile manufacturing operations run by foreign investors or Chinese nationals with broad business experience.
Many others, however, were small firms with no experience importing cotton or using
transnational contracts, and no experience with or access to price risk-management
tools, which were underdeveloped in China at this time.
The problems associated with contract defaults in the Chinese market were intensified given the different legal norms that operated in China. The Chinese state had ratified the 1958 New York Convention; however, as in many developing countries,
Chinese state courts did not necessarily enforce private arbitral decisions as per the
Convention but rather reopened cases based on the public policy clause. For example,
one transnational merchant reported that he took an arbitral award to a Chinese court to
have it enforced when the spinning firm refused to pay. The judge decided not to enforce
the award to avoid bankrupting the offending spinning firm and leaving hundreds of
community members jobless as a result. The Chinese legal system was highly embedded in guanxi, or networks of personal connections. Such situations intensified merchants’ interest in creating standardized contract rules that were enforceable in China.
At the same time as merchants’ interest in standardization intensified, the Chinese
state recognized that contract sanctity was linked to the textile sector’s profitability
vis-à-vis other countries. Without price risk-management tools, spinning firms needed
a good reputation for reliable payment and contract sanctity so that merchants would
offer them on-call pricing, or, in other words, extend them credit for a window of time
during which they could watch price fluctuations and “call” the best price. If spinning
firms could not use on-call pricing, they risked paying more for cotton if prices increased,
as a service provider to merchants explained:
About three years ago, there was a price hike of 20 cents per pound. This ended
up making Chinese yarns more expensive than Indonesian yarns because Indonesia
could use on-call prices and Chinese buyers couldn’t as no one trusted them or
Chinese arbitration enough to extend them credit. So China was paying 20 cents
a pound more for cotton on a spot market while the Indonesian spinners could
wait for the price to fall again.
Chinese spinning firms’ global competitiveness was reliant on a reputation for contract sanctity. Moreover, the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sectors was
critical to Chinese national development overall given the jobs these sectors created.
Far from unrivalled in the construction of private contract rules for the global cotton trade, transnational cotton merchants faced a formidable bargaining foe. The
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Chinese state wanted contract rules that would sharpen the competitiveness of these
sectors, and this meant challenging rather than accepting the rules of the transnational
merchants’ trade association, the LCA. Like many industry players around the world,
the Chinese state considered the LCA rules to be trader-biased—developed by, and in
the interests of, transnational merchants. One of the LCA’s arbitrators explained this
perception: “It’s because they are trader-biased! But others could come and join our
organization and change them.” The Chinese state could not, however, continue to
govern contract rules directly, given the privatization of Chinatex. Instead, as in other
industries, in 2006 the state established a trade association—the China Cotton Association
(CCA)—that was related to the state through a “state corporatist relationship.”50 The
CCA would develop a standard contract that would serve as an “industry best practices”
model for their inexperienced spinning firms.
Given their significant dependence on transnational merchants, the CCA decided
that the merchants’ trade association, the LCA, could negotiate with them over the
standard contract. Merchants preferred to negotiate from the starting point of the LCA
rules rather than the CCA rules. Whose rules mattered, as the LCA and the CCA were
not merely negotiating over the content of the rules. Contract rules were embedded in
trade associations that would oversee these rules in the future and would make decisions regarding how rules should change and be interpreted. From this perspective, the
trade association under which negotiations would unfold could have implications for
who would have authority over rules in the future. Despite this less than ideal situation
for merchants, the LCA agreed to negotiate—any rules were better than no rules, at
least in the short term.
Two issues were particularly contentious in negotiations. First, as the 1958 New York
Convention allowed transacting parties to settle disputes through private arbitral bodies instead of state courts, a central point of contention was over whose arbitral body
would settle contract disputes. The merchants wanted to name the LCA as the arbitral
authority, while the CCA wanted disputes arbitrated by the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). As sociolegal scholars
argue, which private arbitral body settles disputes matters, as they can vary significantly based on their historical development in relation to the domestic legal professions, arbitral practices, and legal systems of particular countries and/or sectors.51
Different arbitral bodies and arbitrators have different conceptions of what arbitration
should look like and how it should operate. Therefore, which arbitral body is used
determines who is “able to play by their own terms.”52 The LCA, for example, was
steeped in the private rules, norms, and culture of the transnational cotton merchant
community, had developed out of the Anglo-American arbitration tradition and legal
systems, and was developed to address the technical specificities of the cotton trade.
CIETAC, in contrast, was developed in relation to the legal rules and cultural norms
in China and conducted arbitration for commercial disputes across a range of sectors. Santos suggests that, by demanding use of its arbitral body in disputes in a
number of sectors, the Chinese state and Chinese firms are trying to impose some of
the particularistic qualities of Chinese capitalism and Chinese modernization on private arbitration practices.53
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The second highly contentious issue was the quality terms of the contract. Cotton
contracts commonly include a quality penalty, which dictates the penalty to be paid per
bale if the quality of the shipment is found to be below the quality range stated in the
contract. Merchants aim to keep this penalty low as they have historically made money
by agreeing to a certain quality range but then shipping in the bottom end of the range
or including a few subquality bales. Also, merchants assume the risk that the quality of
bales could change during transport due to improper storage or water damage. Spinning
firms, on the other hand, desire high-quality penalties, as the quality of their yarn
depends on receiving the cotton quality that they purchased, and they generally produce yarn to meet the quality specifications of a particular sales contract. To ensure the
interests of the Chinese textile sector, the CCA wanted high-quality penalties.54 From
the perspective of the transnational merchants who trade millions of bales a year, this
was an unreasonable demand. As one vice president explains: “There are huge penalty differences [between the CCA contract and the LCA contract]. $30 per bale vs.
$3 dollars per bale!”
After tense negotiations, the CCA and the LCA came to a compromise on arbitration. The CCA agreed to allow parties to choose either CIETAC or LCA arbitration.
However, the CCA refused to compromise on quality terms in the official version of
the contract. In so doing, the CCA essentially declared a stalemate in efforts to develop
standardized contract rules.

The Need for Legitimate
Cotton Contract Rules
The CCA’s challenge compelled transnational cotton merchants to pursue new strategies in order to ensure their future economic and institutional power in the cotton
sector. Not only were transnational merchants dissatisfied with the official rules that
the CCA ultimately released, they were also concerned that these rules favoring textile
manufacturers would become the foundation for a broader standardization of contract
rules for the global cotton trade. Given this threat, the LCA decided to solidify its
leadership in the sector. Specifically, the LCA proposed that private trade associations
representing merchants and textile manufacturers around the world should adopt the
LCA contract rules as the global rules governing cotton contracts (see Table 1). It cast
its proposal as representing the general interest of the “cotton community” as a whole,
as the president of the ICA explained:
China is now a Member of the WTO and by the end of the year 2005 is likely
to represent close to 40 percent of the world’s cotton consumption. . . . It is time
now to work closely with our Chinese friends on the issue of cotton trade rules
in China. . . . History has shown that wherever there is not a clear understanding
of rules, disputes are much more likely to occur. It will be in the interest of the
entire world to make sure that this clear understanding is in place.55

Quark

21

LCA officials urged others in the industry to “take up the call for further growth in trade
through standardization.”56 They hoped that standardization around their rules in the
sector as a whole would give them greater bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the CCA. At this
time, the CCA was not a member of the key international cotton organizations, such
as the Committee for International Cooperation among Cotton Associations (CICCA),
due to Taiwan’s participation.
Other cotton trade associations, however, echoed the CCA’s critiques that the LCA
rules were trader-biased and thus were reluctant to replace their own rules and procedures with those of the LCA. Textile manufacturers in Turkey and Bangladesh, for
example, raised concerns about a range of rules which they perceived as protecting merchants more than spinners, including the rules for delay in shipment, quality complaints,
and sellers’ late payment of claims for weight and quality.57 A number of textile manufacturers also considered LCA procedures for arbitrating contract disputes to be biased.
The LCA rules, like the rules of the European cotton associations, specified a practice
called “invoicing back,” which tried to resolve disputes by returning transacting parties
to the same situation they would be in if the contract had been fulfilled normally. In both
the LCA rules and those of the continental European trade associations, for example, if
a merchant did not deliver cotton to a textile manufacturer as specified in a contract, the
merchant would have to repay any money that the textile manufacturer had already paid
for the shipment, plus the difference between the price stated in the contract and the spot
market price at the time of default, which would allow the textile manufacturer to purchase cotton to replace the portion that was not delivered.
The LCA rules on invoicing back, however, diverged from the rules of the European
trade associations in key respects. First, the LCA rules did not allow aggrieved parties
to claim additional damages related to a contract default. An LCA official explained:
“LCA rules don’t address consequential costs or losses. Like if the cotton doesn’t
arrive, what additional costs this creates for spinners.” Losses or costs incurred as a
result of the contract nonperformance could not be claimed, unless the parties added
specific additional contract terms that deemed specific consequential costs recoverable.58 Moreover, the LCA had what was considered an adversarial arbitration system,
or a “hired gun” system, in which each party to the dispute paid an arbitrator and a
two-person panel decided the outcome. The end result was thus significantly influenced by parties who could compensate the best arbitrator; countries in the global
South felt this put them at a significant disadvantage because arbitrators could charge
between 75 to 150 GBP per hour (approx. $150 to $300USD).59
Trade associations were also skeptical of the biased authority structure of the
LCA. The LCA wanted to claim global authority, yet its executive board, its key
decision-making committees, and its membership in general did not represent the
diversity of actors in the global cotton trade. The LCA was largely a trade association of Western-based merchants, and the majority of the organization’s officers, as
well as officially recognized arbitrators, were U.S. and British merchants and specialized arbitration firms.
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Note: Data for Germany includes both East and West Germany prior to unification.
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee, Documents of the ICAC (CD-ROM).

The resistance to the LCA rules was not resistance to global standardization per se.
Rather, textile manufacturers and domestic merchants in other trade associations simply
had different interests in what global rules should be, given their historical embeddedness in different contract governance institutions. In this context, different trade associations responded differently to the LCA’s standardization proposal, depending on
their different positions in the sector. The continental European trade associations and
cotton exchanges,60 for example, had developed their own contract rules and arbitral
bodies in the late 1800s and early 1900s to govern cotton imports. The European associations were adept at using their own rules and procedures to secure advantages in
contracts and arbitration and were not interested in adopting the ICA rules. At the same
time, however, the European textile industries had declined precipitously in recent
decades (see Figure 5), and their trade associations were attempting to stave off their
decline in both market share and influence within the transnational cotton trade (see
Figure 6). In 1999, the seven European cotton trade associations, including the LCA,
had formed the European Cotton Confederation (ECC) to promote greater cooperation
in the European industry.61 When the LCA proposed the adoption of its rules, the
remaining members of the ECC decided instead to negotiate standard European rules
for cotton contracts and arbitration, in part due to the commonalities between the
contract rules and arbitration procedures based in the continental European civil law
tradition versus the Anglo-American common law tradition. The ECC thus launched a
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competing effort to construct standardized contract rules, contesting whose association
should lead global standardization.
For textile manufacturers and domestic merchants in many other countries, adoption of the LCA rules would reflect a much more profound shift in contract governance. Like in China, many states in developing countries had established state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) to import and export cotton in the postwar period, including India,
Pakistan, Egypt, and the cotton-producing countries in the CFA zone. From the 1980s
to the 2000s, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and later the WTO—
pushed for the privatization of SOEs in cotton and other sectors, citing them as inefficient and/or barriers to free trade. In the newly privatized environment, however,
textile manufacturers, domestic merchants, and cotton producers in these countries
were inexperienced and faced a cadre of powerful transnational merchants who wanted
to impose their rules and arbitral procedures. In this context, many actors in developing countries had little choice but to accept LCA rules and arbitration in their contracts. Trade associations in developing countries were thus reluctant to formally adopt
the LCA rules.
Some of the most vocal protests came from textile manufacturers and merchants in
the Indian cotton industry, who argued that the fact that there were only a few large
transnational traders and thousands of small spinners in India put them at a bargaining
disadvantage.62 This is what also drove Indian firms to contest LCA arbitral decisions
in state courts—a practice that transnational merchants were hoping to eliminate. Like
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firms in other developing countries, Indian firms saw state courts as places to turn when
more powerful transnational merchants forced them into unfair deals.
Unwilling to adopt what they saw as biased LCA rules and arbitration procedures,
Indian buyers and textile manufacturers adopted a different strategy. They developed
a standard contract for importing cotton to India.63 These were nationally focused rules
that Indian firms wanted to use for imports and exports from India to offset what they
saw as their significant bargaining disadvantage in the global market. The LCA was
not pleased with this development. As an LCA official explained:
A few years back when we started the standardization [of contract rules], India
appeared to be a real threat as they didn’t want to adopt the LCA rules. They
thought the LCA rules represented Western companies and Western power trying to impose on them and dominate them. They didn’t want to accept them.
They wanted to use Indian law and Indian arbitration.
Ultimately, however, the LCA largely dismissed the Indian associations’ protests.
At this time, India was still a relatively small player in the transnational trade. While
transnational merchants had suffered losses due to contract defaults in the Indian market, they were not about to use the Indian standard contract or negotiate on the Indian
industry’s terms.

Constructing Legitimacy over Contract Rules,
Creating Opportunities for Weaker Actors
Amid these criticisms of the LCA as a biased institution that did not represent the
interests of diverse constituencies in the transnational cotton trade, the LCA realized
that if it wanted to use standardization to gain leverage vis-à-vis the CCA, it would
need to establish leadership more through consent than coercion. To this end, the LCA
decided to launch a campaign to construct hegemony: (1) by changing key rules to
gain weaker actors’ consent; (2) by discursively framing LCA rules as “ethical” business practices; and (3) by making its authority structure more representative. The LCA
hoped that these efforts would persuade other trade associations to join the LCA,
ultimately bolstering its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese state. For other trade
associations, the LCA’s bid for hegemony created new opportunities to have their
voices heard. Depending on their competitive positions, different trade associations
would choose to adopt or resist the LCA rules in attempts to gain relatively greater
institutional power over contract rules into the future.
The LCA’s first strategy was to evaluate and revise their rules in order to claim
their impartiality. The LCA compared its rules and procedures with those of other
private trade associations and arbitral bodies, such as the Sugar Association and the
Grain and Feeds Trade Association. Further, it invited the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators to provide an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of its arbitration
procedures in comparison to other UK-based trade associations. Based on these
evaluations, one of the key changes made was to its arbitration practices. The LCA
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decided to replace its adversarial arbitration system with a tribunal system, more
similar to the one used in the continental European trade associations. In the new
tribunal system, each party would still appoint and pay an arbitrator, but the LCA
would also appoint a chairperson to each arbitration panel. This chairperson would
manage the arbitration and would have the final vote on the arbitral award. In addition,
any and all payments for arbitration would have to be made through the ICA Secretariat
to ensure transparency.64
The LCA was not willing, however, to change its controversial invoicing back
rules. Instead, it made a strategic interim concession to other trade associations. The
LCA announced that it would allow trade associations to adopt the LCA rules without
adopting LCA arbitration. This meant that industry players would write their contracts
according to LCA rules but, in the case of a dispute, they would settle it using the
procedures of their national trade association. This represented a significant—but
strategic—concession. By letting cotton associations keep arbitration within their own
associations, transnational merchants put aside for the time being their goal of establishing the LCA as the authoritative arbitral body for the industry. In this way, it would
keep continued conflict over LCA arbitration procedures—and the failure to link
blame with breach of contract—from halting all standardization efforts. At the same
time, it would achieve perhaps a more important goal: constructing broader support for
private arbitration and enforcement outside of state courts. When transnational merchants had pushed clients to use LCA arbitration, they had responded by turning to
state courts when disputes arose. Allowing members of other trade associations to use
their own arbitral bodies meant that transnational merchants would have to loosen
their control over arbitration but would increase the acceptance of private arbitration
and enforcement. If actors were using their own arbitration bodies and procedures, they
would be more likely to respond to private enforcement mechanisms like blacklists
and less likely to challenge arbitral decisions in state courts.
The LCA’s second strategy was to use these rule changes as the basis of a discursive
campaign to claim its impartiality and thus its legitimate leadership in the standardization of global contract rules. To launch this effort, in 2004 the LCA re-branded itself
as the ICA, the International Cotton Association. The president of the new ICA declared:
“By altering our name we are making a statement to the world. We are the internationally recognized arbitral body for cotton.”65 The ICA argued that for members of the
“cotton community” to benefit from expanding global trade, the cotton trade had to be
based on “ethical” trading practices. From the ICA’s perspective, those who upheld
contract sanctity were ethical businesspeople, while those who defaulted on contracts
were not. The ICA argued that adopting its rules, as well as the blacklist as a private
enforcement mechanism, was:
. . . for your own protection. It serves us nothing if our competitors do not obey
the rules, and attempt to seek some advantage over the honest guys. The responsibility of enforcement is not the Association’s, it is yours, it must be the collective effort of all of us, to ensure that those who do not take our rules seriously,
find themselves isolated.66
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This construction of “ethical” business practices, however, was biased toward larger
players who had access to and the expertise to use price risk-management tools (such
as hedging in futures markets), and thus could manage their risk without resorting to
contract defaults.
Through this “you’re-with-us-or-against-us” mentality, the ICA argued that the
adoption of the ICA rules represented the solution to the lack of common, ethical contract rules for the global cotton trade. The president of the ICA insisted:
The world needs one major trade body and one international set of rules. . . . The
[ICA’s] new rules for arbitration create an open transparency within our system
and it will be extremely hard to argue against the impartiality of the [ICA] now
that this has been created. . . . I also believe that the new rules . . . will help to
address any misconceived perceptions that the [ICA] is not a completely fair
and impartial body.67
In this way, the ICA aimed to distinguish its own neutrality and impartiality with the
unfairness of other potential solutions, such as using nationally focused rules that represented the narrow interests of only some actors.68
To promote this message, the ICA launched an educational campaign to familiarize
textile manufacturers and merchants, particularly in developing countries, with the
newly revised ICA rules. The ICA posted the new rules, a guidebook, and a standard
model contract on its website and translated the ICA rules into four languages in addition
to English: French, Portuguese, Russian, and Mandarin.69 Moreover, from 2006 to 2009,
subsequent presidents, the director general, and other ICA members held interactive
workshops and presentations in China, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Australia,
Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Geneva, Tanzania, Brazil, and the United States.70
Finally, the ICA tackled concerns that its authority structure was unrepresentative
by diversifying its directorships, its network of arbitrators, and its Rules Committee.
In addition to its officers and ordinary directors, the ICA added a new category of
associate directors, who would be “especially appointed to represent the interests and
concerns of international members of the ICA and the principal overseas cotton producing and consuming regions.”71 By 2007, the ICA had appointed associate directors
to represent the African Cotton Association, the Indonesian Textile Industry, the Pakistan
Cotton Textile Industry, the Turkish Cotton Industry, the Australian Cotton Industry,
the Committee for International Cooperation among Cotton Associations (CICCA), and
the International Textiles Manufacturers Federation (ITMF).72
The ICA further initiated a training program to globalize its network of arbitrators.
While this meant decentralizing control over arbitration processes, an ICA representative explained its rationale:
The ICA is encouraging more overseas arbitrators. Right now, more than half of
arbitrators are UK-based. But we need arbitrators in China, in India. We’ve got
to do it, there is no choice really. We need the credibility. . . . If we can certify
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arbitrators across the world, then people aren’t so against it just being some
decision coming down from Liverpool. But they can say, I’ve got my own guy
here, my ICA arbitrator in my own country who speaks my language. And then
my arbitration panel might have someone from Brazil on it and an independent
person appointed by the ICA—so you’d really feel like you were getting an
unbiased opinion.
In October 2006 at their annual meetings, the ICA held the first-ever examination to
become a certified ICA arbitrator. In the first seven months, thirty-one members, from
the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, Germany, China, Singapore, and
Belgium, passed the Level 1 Arbitrator Training Course exam; twenty more were scheduled to take the exam by the end of 2007.73
In perhaps its most significant concession to establish greater representation, the
ICA decided to strategically diversify its Rules Committee. At its annual meeting in
2006, it announced that every trade association that adopted the ICA rules would be
given a seat on the ICA Rules Committee. The Rules Committee debated rule changes
and drafted proposals to be approved by the membership. A representative of the ICA
explained the rationale behind this decision:
We will tell every cotton association, if they accept our rules, they can have a
spot on our rules committee. So then they feel like they have a say in it, it is not
just Liverpool telling them what to do.
By offering to incorporate other trade associations into the Rules Committee, the
ICA was loosening control over this key agenda-setting function in order to gain broader
support for its leadership in the sector. In sum, by changing rules, by framing them as
representing business ethics, and by incorporating a broader spectrum of actors within
its institutional structure, the ICA hoped to legitimate its claims to be an impartial and
globally representative association.
Trade associations representing textile manufacturers and merchants in different
regions responded differently to the ICA’s bid for hegemony based on their shifting
competitive positions. As the ICA had pursued its hegemonic project, the ECC had
successfully standardized the rules of the European trade associations. The Gydnia
Cotton Association in Poland, the Belgian Cotton Association, the Association Française
Cotonière (AFCOT) in France, and the Centro Algodonero Nacional in Spain had
officially adopted the ECC rules. However, as the European textile sector had continued to decline (see Figure 5), ECC standardization efforts fractured. Given that many
ECC industries could soon cease to exist, the Bremen Cotton Exchange in Germany
instead chose to adopt the ICA rules.74 The ICA president held up the Bremen Cotton
Exchange as an example:
[T]onight I call upon all other associations to support us in this [standardization]
task through closer cooperation. Bremen is a fine example of this cooperation:
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they support the idea of “one set of rules” and are currently working on replacing the Bremen Rules with the International Rules. This is a vital step towards
harmonization. We appeal to the remaining associations to join this process. In
Abraham Lincoln’s words: united we stand, divided we fall.75
Soon after, an ICA representative reported that the Belgian Cotton Association, the
Gdynia Cotton Association, and the Centro Algodonero Nacional had initiated discussions regarding the adoption of ICA rules. The Gdynia Cotton Association officially
adopted the ICA rules in 2010. From a depressed market position, these European
associations began to see seats on the ICA’s Rule Committee as their best bet to maintain decision-making power over contract rules as their economic power dwindled.
However, the French association, AFCOT, was reluctant to adopt ICA rules, given
their distinct position within the global cotton trade. The French textile industry had
declined, but French cotton merchants were attempting to compete in the increasingly
consolidated merchant sector. The French merchant Geocoton, in particular, had taken
over the former French SOE CFDT, which had enjoyed export monopolies in West
African countries in the postcolonial period.76 As its formal export monopolies ended
with the privatization of both French and West African SOEs, Geocoton wanted to
maintain its regional advantage in West Africa and saw use of its own contract rules as
one way to do so.77 AFCOT reported that it aimed to maintain its special link to West
African countries, including a French-speaking cotton culture, through the elaboration
of common rules for contract sanctity and arbitration.78 By maintaining the French
AFCOT rules, the merchants in AFCOT hoped to solidify relationships with the new
class of West African domestic merchants emerging in the wake of SOE privatization.
While AFCOT was reluctant to adopt ICA rules, the leadership of the African
Cotton Association (ACA) at the time took a role in promoting their adoption. From
the perspective of some West African domestic merchants, adopting the ICA rules
could be strategic. As the French now had to compete with other merchants to source
African cotton, African merchants and producers hoped to play several companies
against each other to escape to some degree the price-fixing that came with the French
export monopoly. Becoming fluent in the ICA rules could help African merchants better exercise their new bargaining power. Leaders of the ACA thus began to work with
the ICA to facilitate workshops in African countries on how to use ICA rules.
Finally, the Indian trade associations,79 which had expressed resistance to the ICA
rules in the past, had begun internal discussions around their adoption. Since the ICA
launched its initial efforts to lead the standardization of contract rules, the Indian textile sector had grown significantly, becoming the second largest consumer of raw cotton in the world behind China.80 Much like the CCA, there were benefits to adoption
for Indian textile manufacturers: improving their reputation for contract sanctity to
access on-call pricing. As such, representatives of the Indian industry decided to at
least consider the ICA rules, as a representative of the Cotton Association of India
(CAI) commented: “We want to study them. We’ve formed a committee . . . over the
next year we are going to compare [the ICA rules] to our rules and see what we would
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be agreeing to, if we were to adopt them.” But actors in the Indian sector still had
misgivings regarding what they saw as a largely top-down imposition of the ICA rules.
For example, as a panel of ICA representatives gave updates on the standardization
process at the 2006 ICAC meetings, an Indian merchant reminded participants that
what was needed was not just updates but a “consultative and consensus process.”
Despite this plan to consider the ICA rules, another opportunity was emerging for
Indian merchants. In the course of a few years, India’s cotton production had dramatically increased due to rising yields.81 The Indian sector surpassed the United States to
become the second-largest cotton producer in the world behind China. As production
significantly outstripped consumption, India radically increased its exports (see Figure 7),
and its share of world cotton exports increased from 8 percent to 12 percent from 2005
to 2007.82 Moreover, Indian merchants enjoyed a competitive advantage as the cotton
trade became focused on China. Indian cotton was selling for three to five cents lower
per pound than U.S. cotton given lower transport costs.83 With its increasingly significant position on the export market, resistance to the ICA rules made sense as part of
Indian merchants’ broader expansionary strategy. As an Indian merchant commented,
“we were working on moving to the ICA rules . . . but [now] there is not as much interest in moving it forward.” With growing exports, Indian merchants had the potential to
“hook on” to China’s rapid growth by establishing direct trading relationships with
Chinese textile manufacturers, allowing them to bypass transnational merchants and
the ICA rules.
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In sum, the ICA had made inroads in its attempts to construct it leadership and
control over cotton contract rules. Some trade associations had indeed begun adoption
of the ICA rules. However, the ICA’s hegemonic project, launched due to the challenge
posed by the CCA, created new strategic opportunities for weaker actors to demand
greater representation in contract governance and, in the case of AFCOT and the CAI,
to try to undermine the ICA’s claim to sectoral leadership. In terms of its broader goal
to increase bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China, the ICA’s success was mixed. In a
demonstration of its growing willingness to negotiate with the global cotton community,
the CCA joined CICCA in 2007—an important step given CICCA’s close cooperation
with the ICA and China’s general refusal as yet to participate in other international
cotton bodies. Transnational merchants also convinced the CCA to work with them to
offer educational workshops on rules for contracts and dispute arbitration for Chinese
spinners. Despite these signs of cooperation, the CCA remained dedicated to the promotion of the CCA contract and CIETAC arbitration. As of 2009, while some standardization has been achieved, contestation continues over whose rules will govern
cotton contracts on a global stage.

Conclusion
Evidence from the case suggests that we need a more dynamic model of institution
building in order to understand emerging forms of coordination and governance structures within commodity chains. Western, transnational merchants are not unrivalled in
their attempt to claim institutional power in the cotton trade, as GCC scholarship often
implies through its emphasis on ideal types of corporate-led governance structures.
Rather, the Chinese state made its own bid to set rules to govern cotton imports to
ensure the competitiveness of its textile and apparel sectors. This indicates the need
to revise existing accounts in order to explore contested processes of institutionbuilding in commodity chains. Such an approach allows us to explore not only how a
commodity chain is governed but also how a given governance structure and the forms
of coordination that underpin it emerge and are constructed as legitimate.
Understanding how private governance is constructed as legitimate and thus enfor
ceable requires a revision and extension of GCC/GVC scholarship. First, we need to
complicate the conceptualization of agency within GCC/GVC analyses. While the
GCC framework does see transnational firms as agents that organize commodity
chains to serve their interests, by failing to consider the legitimacy of these arrangements, agency becomes narrowly defined in terms of who can exercise the most economic power. The GVC framework tends to overlook agency entirely.
The case of cotton contract rules lays bare the overly static view of governance that
results from these approaches and demonstrates the need to consider how strategic
action and competition shape institution-building. Who would control contract rules
could not be read off the economic structure. Rather, actors strategized and struggled
to construct a set of rules and an institutional structure that would best reflect their
interests and be accepted by other actors. These were not unrivalled “lead” actors but
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institutional entrepreneurs actively reconfiguring institutional arrangements to solve
their problems. In this view, it was strategic action that played a critical role in constructing the—albeit partial and tentative—legitimacy of the ICA rules.
Yet, this strategic action in negotiations was constrained by the broader institutional
context in which negotiations were embedded. This points to another revision required
in the existing framework. GCC/GVC scholars have been widely criticized for focusing on variables endogenous to commodity chains to explain governance, ignoring the
broader institutional context in which commodity chains are embedded. However,
broader institutional shifts play a critical role in constituting the overall power dynamics in a commodity chain. It was shifts in the broader institutional context—the end of
the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO—that reconfigured power dynamics,
making China a major player in contract rule negotiations.
Broader institutional arrangements structured both the material and discursive terrain of struggle in the cotton trade. In transnational merchants’ efforts to persuade
others to accept their rules and trade association, they enjoyed a privileged position.
Their preferred institutional arrangements for private contract governance had already
been globalized in the 1958 New York Convention, and many states had been compelled to sign on to this Convention through structural adjustment programs. Moreover,
this Convention had legitimized discourses about what made contract governance fair,
specifically the idea that actors enter into contracts freely and consensually. Transnational
merchants were able to draw on and reconstruct these discourses in their effort to
define ethical business practices and legitimate their rules.
The case of cotton contract rules also complicates our understanding of institutional
context in another way. Exploring institutional context means considering not only
new supranational institutions, discourses, and agreements but also the diverse institutional arrangements in which different actors have historically been embedded. As
economic geographers and varieties of capitalism scholars have suggested, we need to
account for institutional variation across space.
GCC/GVC research has largely ignored such variation. From this view, actors’
interests and strategies can be understood by virtue of their functional position on the
commodity chain. As negotiations in the cotton trade suggest, this perspective overlooks other critical dimensions. In the cotton trade, different actors have historically
been embedded in different institutional arrangements for governing contracts, such as
private versus state governance, governance of nationally versus regionally versus
postcolonial-focused trade, and governance embedded in different state legal systems.
As such, actors have developed distinct business practices, customs, and competencies, as well as understandings of what makes contract governance fair. Actors’ distinct institutional embeddedness critically shaped how they responded to transnational
merchants’ bid to control contract rules. This is not to say that an actor’s functional
position in a chain does not matter. Indeed, a key point of contention between transnational merchants and the Chinese state was over their different interests in how quality
would be governed, given their positions as sellers vs. buyers. However, functional
position alone is not sufficient for understanding why the issue of whose arbitral body
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would settle disputes was a critical point of contention. It is only by considering institutional variation across space that we can trace the advantages gained by compelling
others to “play by your rules.”
A broader view of strategic action, competitive dynamics, and institutional context
also raises new questions for Gereffi’s typology of chains and the general claim that
chains are becoming more buyer-driven in the current era. My case tentatively confirms that the trader-driven nature of the cotton chain is being challenged by buyerdriven dynamics. However, Gereffi’s typology leaves us unable to account for how
and why such changes emerge except to posit the growing power of retailers. Evidence
from this case and existing scholarship suggests that a more complex analysis is necessary. Gibbon and Ponte argue that changes in trade rules can influence whether producers or buyers “drive” a particular commodity chain.84 I confirm this claim, as we
see how the end of the MFA and the accession of China to the WTO upset the initial
trader-driven nature of the chain. However, my analysis further suggests that the
trader- versus buyer-driven nature of the cotton trade is a point of contestation, and
the victor will not emerge through economic dominance alone. Rather, who drives a
chain should be understood as constructed through competition for both economic and
institutional power.
In sum, evidence from the cotton trade demonstrates the need for modifications to
the GCC/GVC framework. I have put forth a more dynamic model that captures how
private governance is constructed through the intersection of strategic action, dominant
discourses, existing institutional arrangements, and competitive dynamics. These findings underline the importance of attending to institutional context, institutional variation across space, and the cultural political economy of commodity chains. It is only by
exploring this more dynamic process of institution-building that we can understand
how and why transnational governance arrangements emerge and are established as
legitimate and enforceable.
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